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With the large number of Android apps available in app stores such as Google Play, it has 
become increasingly challenging to choose among the apps. The users generally select the apps 
based on the ratings and reviews of other users, or the recommendations from the app store. But it 
is very important to take the security into consideration while choosing an app with the increasing 
security and privacy concerns with mobile apps. This thesis proposes different ranking schemes 
for Android apps based on security apps evaluated from the static code analysis tools that are 
available. It proposes the ranking schemes based on the categories of evidences reported by the 
tools, based on the frequency of each category, and based on the severity of each evidence. The 
evidences are gathered, and rankings are generated based on the theory of Subjective Logic. In 
addition to these ranking schemes, the tools are themselves evaluated against the Ghera benchmark. 
Finally, this work proposes two additional schemes to combine the evidences from difference tools 
to provide a combined ranking. 
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  INTRODUCTION  
There has been a significant increase in the usage of smartphones in the past decade [1]. 
Google’s Android OS and Apple’s iOS have been the two most popular operating systems that 
have been most widely used for the smartphone devices. Android OS dominates the smartphone 
market share, running in more than 70% of all mobile devices [2]. This popularity of smartphones 
has also led to development of large number of apps that run on these devices. As of November 
2020, there are over 3 million Android Apps published in Google Play, the official marketplace 
for Android Apps [3].  
In this competitive market, the users of these mobile devices have the flexibility of selecting 
apps for their particular needs from a large variety of apps. People generally rely on the app ratings 
and reviews, and the features mentioned in the description of the apps on the app store for selecting 
apps for their use. The app ratings and reviews alone can sometimes be biased and may not be a 
true reflection of the quality of the apps. Security is one of the most important internal metrics 
which should be considered during the selection of apps. This thesis proposes a way of ranking 
and selecting apps based on the security evidences gathered through the static code analysis of the 
apps. 
The types of security risks posed by mobile apps are quite different from the risks involved 
with desktop or Web software. Most of the mobile applications rely on user data and constantly 
communicate through network with remote servers and devices. It is important to make sure that 
the data is protected within the device as well as when it is being transmitted over a communication 
channel such as WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC, etc. With the advancement of smartphones, people have 
become more dependent on such devices. Many apps use important personal data of the users (such 
as their photos, location, personal messages, etc.), which makes the security of data even more 
important. Hence, it is important to take the security of the applications into consideration while 
downloading an app. We are considering these security issues for ranking Android apps so that the 
users can consider them while downloading an app for their usage. 
There have been numerous efforts on identifying and categorizing the security issues in 
mobile apps. Several open source and commercial static analysis tools are available that can detect 
security issues in the applications. These tools are generally used during development to detect 
and fix security and privacy issues. We use these tools as the sources of evidence to rank apps. 
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One of the challenges that needs to be considered, while collecting security-related evidences 
is that the issues detected by the static analysis tools are not all equivalent. Hence, we need to 
consider issues such as the frequency, severity, impact, etc., of the issues to get a better ranking of 
similar apps. There are standards such as OWASP Mobile Top Ten [4] and Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE) in Mobile Applications [5] that categorizes the security issues into different 
levels of severity. While these standards categorize the security vulnerabilities, each category 
within the standards can cover a broad number of vulnerabilities that can have different severity. 
During the security analysis, another standard metric that considers different issues is the Common 
Vulnerability Security Score (CVSS). CVSS is a metric that calculates a security score based on 
factors such as the type of attack, its severity, complexity of exploiting the vulnerability, and the 
impact of the vulnerability in terms of confidentiality, availability and integrity. In the research, 
the issues being detected are classified and scored using the CVSS and integrated into our ranking 
methodology. 
Another challenge is that the tools may themselves not be reliable. Most of the static analysis 
tools are known to report false positives [6]. It is difficult to consider each issue when we are 
running static analysis on large number of real-world apps. This can be overcome by using a 
sample set of benchmark apps to analyze the reliability of the tools. This research uses Ghera 
android vulnerabilities benchmark [7] to benchmark each of the selected static analysis tools, and 
based on the performance on the benchmark, we have assigned them a reputation score. The Ghera 
benchmark is chosen over other available benchmarks due several factors including the number of 
issues reported across different categories, the nature of the issues reported, and the format of the 
benchmark apps are organized. 
Finally, the degree of our belief (our trust) that an app is secure needs to be quantified. 
Subjective Logic [8] is used to represent the trust of different app based on the evidences generated 
by the static analysis tools. Subjective Logic allows us to represent an opinion about a proposition 
(in our research, the proposition being that the app is secure) using a tuple of belief, disbelief and 
uncertainty. Subjective Logic is used because it incorporates a degree of uncertainty unlike 
traditional binary logic. It also provides several operators that can be used to combine opinions. 
These operators are useful in calculating the trust of an app and combining the opinion of multiple 
static analysis tools. 
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In this research, we have proposed three basic ranking schemes that consider different factors 
for calculating the ranks. The first scheme uses the different categories of vulnerabilities present 
in the apps. The second scheme considers the frequency of vulnerabilities in each category. The 
third scheme considers the severity of each vulnerability based on the CVSS. We can use these 
three schemes to calculate ranks using each of the selected tools separately. We also provide two 
additional schemes to combine the ranks from the selected tools. Among the two schemes that 
combine the opinions of different tools, the first one considers each tool equally whereas the 
second tools assign a weight to each tool based on their performance in the benchmark. 
The analysis is performed using three different static analysis tools. Our dataset contains 175 
apps across 8 different categories. Five of the categories (finance, insurance, news, shopping, and 
travel) consist of 5 apps each. These five categories help in performing a detailed analysis of our 
ranking schemes. Three categories (games, photography, and tools) contain 50 apps in each 
category. We have used these three categories to validate our ranking schemes in a larger data set.  
Any ranking of app is subjective in nature and depends on various factors that are taken into 
consideration and the weightage given those factors. There is no single ground truth that we can 
rely to measure the correctness of any ranking method. The ranking schemes that we have proposed 
in this research provide a justifiable ranking scheme based on the security evidences from different 
static analysis tools and provide a basis for similar research in the future. 
1.1 Objective 
The goal of the thesis is to analyze the security vulnerabilities present in android applications 
and develop schemes for ranking the applications based on the presence of security vulnerabilities.  
1.2 Contribution 
1. This thesis proposes three basic ranking schemes based on empirically collected security 
evidences using Subjective Logic, and two additional schemes to combine rankings from 
different static analysis tools from the basic schemes. 
2. This research performs an empirical analysis and obtain the CVSS scores for the 
evidences detected by the static code analysis tools used in the experiments. 
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3. This effort researches common benchmarks and analyzes the reliability of the static code 
analysis tools for integrating them into the ranking scheme. 
4. Finally, this work employs the proposed schemes on Apps collected from the Google Play 





 RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND 
This chapter discusses the background theory of the related concepts and describes 
prominent research efforts associated with the work for this research.  
2.1 Key Concepts related to Android 
There are several key concepts related to Android Apps that are useful while analyzing the 
security of the Android applications. 
 Android Components 
An android app is comprised of four different types of components [9]: 
1. Activities [10]: An Activity provides the user interface for the apps. It usually 
represents a single screen in the app. It displays the views to the users and handles user 
interactions. Activities also allow users to navigate to other activities. 
2. Services [11]: Services is a component that allows handling of background tasks. It 
does not provide any user interface. Services can be used for tasks such as playing 
music in the background, syncing data over network, etc. Services are of three types: 
a. Foreground Services: These services are noticeable to the users and must display 
a notification. An example of foreground service is an audio app playing music in 
the background. 
b. Background Services: These services perform operations in the background 
without any notification to the users. 
c. Bound Services: These services are tied to other components and can exchange 
data with the components it is bounded to. 
3. Broadcast Receivers [12]: Broadcast Receivers provide a mechanism for different 
events to be delivered outside the regular flow of the apps. For example, we can use 
broadcast receiver to listen for a broadcast announcing that the battery is low, and the 
receiver gets triggered even when the app is not running. 
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4. Content Providers [13]: Content providers manage the app data stored in any 
persistence mechanism. Other apps can query or modify the data through the content 
providers with appropriate permissions. 
The activities, services, and broadcast receivers are activated using messages called Intents 
[14]. Intents are used to build components together at runtime. Intents can also contain data that is 
passed onto the components. Intents are of two types: 
1. Explicit Intents: It specifies the target application’s package name or a fully qualified 
component class name to trigger a component. 
2. Implicit Intents: Implicit Intents use intent filters to identify the action to be performed, 
and the components that can satisfy the action are triggered to handle it. Implicit intents 
are generally used to allow communication between different apps. 
Content Providers on the other hand are triggered using Content Resolvers [15]. The content 
resolvers provide CRUD (create, read, update, delete) methods for the data source defined in the 
content providers. The content providers are identified using a simple URI that uses the content:// 
schema. 
 Permissions 
Permissions [16] are a security mechanism provided to protect the privacy of the users. Each 
app runs in its own sandbox environment and requires permissions to interact with the system 
resources and other app. Apps must declare permissions to use sensitive data such as performing 
network access, sending SMS, reading or writing the user’s private data, etc. Permissions are 
declared in the manifest file. 
There are three different protection levels of permissions [16]: 
1. Normal Permissions: These permissions are general permissions that do not use private 
data of the users. 
2. Signature Permissions: These permissions are granted only to the apps that are signed by 
the same certificate. 
3. Dangerous Permissions: Dangerous permissions are required to access data or resources 
that involve user’s private information. 
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Before Android 5.1.1, permissions were requested during installation, but from Android 6.0 
onwards dangerous permissions are requested only in the runtime with the normal permission 
being requested at the installation time. 
It is recommended to declare only the permissions that are really required by an app. For 
runtime permissions, it is also recommended to provide the context to why the permission is being 
asked for. 
There are several pre-existing permissions defined in the android system. It is also possible 
to define custom permissions to restrict access to resources provided by the app. 
 App Resources 
Resources such as images, audio files, layouts, styles, etc. are saved in the res folder. A 
unique identifier is generated for each of the resource by the SDK, and this unique code is 
accessible in the source code. 
 The Manifest File 
The AndroidManifest.xml file is an XML file present in all applications that allows the 
system to know the details of the app. It declares all the components along with the application 
details such as the application name, package name, version code, version name, minSdk and 
targetSdk versions, permissions, etc. 
Permissions can be declared using the <uses-permission> tag. The components can be 
declared using the following tags inside the <application> tag: 
• <activity> for Activities 
• <service> for Services 
• <provider> for Content Providers 




Figure 1. Example of Android Manifest File (reproduced verbatim from  [17]) 
An example of manifest from the android developer guide [17] is shown in Figure 1. The 
manifest declares two activities: MainActivity (which is the launcher activity that is launched when 
the app is opened) and the DisplayMessageActivity. We can also see the metadata related to the 
app in the manifest.  
 APK File 
All the compiled code of an android app, along with data and resource files, is packaged as 
an archive file called the Android package (APK). The file has an extension “.apk”. 
The compiled code is in Dalvik Executable (dex) format. Tools such as  dex2jar [18] and 
jadx [19] convert the dex to Java Archive (jar) format, so that the compiled Java classes can be 
analyzed using readily available code analysis tools. 
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2.2 Mobile Application Security 
The security challenges for Mobile Apps are different from the security challenges posed 
by traditional desktop apps and Web apps. This can be primarily attributed to three factors: 
1. The architecture of the mobile platforms such as Android and iOS provide sets of APIs that 
are significantly different from that of desktop or laptop operating systems. The platforms 
themselves take into consideration a lot of factors to make the mobile apps secure. The 
platforms use sandboxing environment to prevent mobile apps from causing harm to the 
device or other apps. They provide APIs to program the apps. Special APIs are provided 
for Inter-Process Communication (IPC). To use features such as Location and Internet, a 
permission model is provided. It is important the applications follow best security practices 
to avoid any leaks of sensitive information. 
2. The purpose, pattern and frequency of the usage of mobile apps are also considerably 
different than those of desktop or Web apps. The users use the applications for various 
tasks to make their day-to-day lives easier. People use apps for managing their navigation, 
finance, education, healthcare, and many other aspects of their lives rather than just 
managing their contacts and phone calls. This means that the apps handle a lot of personal 
data such as location, financial data, and health data. The security challenges are further 
amplified by the fact that the mobile apps generally store these data locally as well as back 
it up in some remote server or other trusted endpoints. Thus, proper security measures 
should be taken to store the data in device, and while communicating these data with trusted 
endpoints. 
3. The apps are usually packaged into an archived file (for example, APK for Android, and 
IPA for iOS). The source code is archived into these files which makes it easier for 
malicious users can decompile these archived files and exploit vulnerabilities present in 
the apps. They can also tamper with the archived file and send it users. The platform 
themselves provide mechanisms to prevent such attacks. These archived files are generally 
signed with the developer’s certificate and the users should only download the app from 
secure and well-known app stores. The apps need to ensure that they are difficult to tamper 
with or reverse engineer by using proper security measures such as code obfuscation. 
Due to these differences in the vulnerabilities of mobile apps, the Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP) has a separate Mobile Security Project. They have identified a separate 
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top ten categories of mobile vulnerabilities published in 2016 [4]. A summary of the top ten 
categories are as follows: 
• M1 Improper Platform Usage: These vulnerabilities are due to misuse of platform APIs 
and the failure of using proper security controls offered by them. 
• M2 Insecure Data Storage: Issues related to insecure data storage and unintended data 
leakage are covered under this category.  
• M3 Insecure Communications: These security issues arise when the data being 
communicated is not secured when communicating with trusted endpoints. 
• M4 Insecure Authentication: This category covers issues when the authentication and 
session management of end users is done poorly.  
• M5 Insufficient Cryptography: These issues arise when cryptography is applied to sensitive 
data being stored or communicated, but the cryptography being implemented itself does 
not fulfil the required security standards. 
• M6 Insecure Authorization: Issues with the authorization of users to use different features 
of the app are included in this category. 
• M7 Client Code Quality: This category includes the code level problems such as buffer 
overflow and memory leaks. 
• M8 Code Tampering: Making changes to the resources or code in the app binary or any 
other form of modifying the original app is covered under this category. 
• M9 Reverse Engineering: Mobile apps can be reverse engineered, and its source code, 
assets and other resources can be exploited to extract sensitive information such as 
cryptography information, backend endpoints and intellectual property. 
• M10 Extraneous Functionality: Unintended or malicious backdoor functionalities or other 
internal developmental issues that can lead to security exploits comprise this category.  
These categories can be utilized to calculate the priority of different categories of findings in 
our research. The relevance of the top ten category decreases from M1 down to M10. But even 
within each of the ten categories, the findings can have a different impact and priority. One of the 




2.3 Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a specification maintained by the 
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) that assigns a numerical value to the 
security vulnerabilities based on their severity. The CVSS score can be used to define the criticality 
of the vulnerabilities that are found in the apps. 
This research uses version 3.0 of CVSS specification. The CVSS specification calculates a 
score based on three metric groups [20]:  
• Basic Metric Group 
• Temporal Metric Group 
• Environmental Metric Group.  
The Basic Metric Group can be further classified into Exploitability Metrics that defines the 
characteristics of the vulnerable component, the Scope that defines the extent to which the 
vulnerability can impact resources beyond its privileges, and the Impact metrics that defines the 
impact on the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the component. [20] 
The Exploitability Metrics consists of the following sub-metrics [20]: 
• Attack Vector (AV): The attack vector defines the context through which the vulnerability 
can be exploited. It can consist of the following values: 
o Network (N): The vulnerability is exposed through the network stack and the 
attacker’s path is through the OSI layer 3. 
o Adjacent (A): The vulnerability is exposed through the network stack but is limited 
to the same shared physical or logical network and cannot be performed across the 
OSI layer 3 boundary. 
o Local (L): The vulnerability is local and is not exposed through the network stack. 
The attacker’s path is through the read/write/execute capabilities. 
o Physical(P): The vulnerability requires a physical access to the device being 
exploited. 
• Attack Complexity (AC): This metric defines the conditions beyond the attacker’s control 
that must be present to exploit the vulnerability. The metric may have a value of low(L) or 
high(H) depending on whether special conditions that requires a measurable amount of 
preparation or execution is required for the exploitation of the vulnerability. 
 
21 
• Privileges Required (PR): This metric defines the level of privilege required to exploit the 
vulnerability. It’s value is None (N) if the attacker does not require any authorization; Low 
(L) if the attacker requires basic privileges that could only affect the settings and files 
owned by users; or High (H) if significant privileges that could affect component-wide 
settings and files are required. 
• User Interaction (UI): This metric can have values None(N) or Required(R) depending on 
whether the exploitation of the vulnerability requires some interaction from the user. 
The scope (S) defines whether the vulnerability in one software component can lead to changes 
across the other components in the system. If the attack only affects the authorized scope, its value 
is Unchanged (U). If the vulnerability affects resources beyond the authorized scope of the 
component being exploited, its scope is Changed (C) [20]. 
The Impact Metrics are defined as follows [20]: 
• Confidentiality Impact (C): It measures the impact to the confidentiality of information 
being managed by the component caused by the exploitation of the vulnerability. If total 
confidentiality is lost, the values is High(H). If some of the information are exposed by the 
vulnerability but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, it 
should be categorized as Low(L). If there is no loss of confidentiality, the metric should 
have value None(N). 
• Integrity Impact (I): It measures the impact on the integrity of the information being 
managed by the component caused by the exploitation of the vulnerability. It should have 
High(H) value if there is total loss of integrity, Low(L) if there is a limited amount of 
modification that can be caused by the attacker, or None(N) if there is no loss of integrity. 
• Availability Metric (A): It measures the impact on availability of the component caused by 
the vulnerability. If the attack can cause total denial of access to resources, the vulnerability 
can be categorized as High (H). If the attack is causes reduced performance or interrupts 
availability temporarily, it can be classified as Low (L). If there is no impact on the 
availability of the system, the metric can be assigned value None (N). 
The Temporal and Environmental Metric groups are optional. The temporal metrics define the 
current state of the exploit technique (Exploit Code Maturity), existence of patches or workarounds 
(Remediation Level) and confidence on the description of vulnerability (Report Confidence). The 
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environmental metrics define the importance of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
Requirements of the affected component to the organization. [20] 
The CVSS metrics can be textually represented in the form of a vector string. The following 
table (extracted from Table 15 in [20]) from the CVSS specification denotes the symbols used for 
the vector string for the base metrics (the symbols for temporal and environmental metrics can be 
found in the specification): 
Table 1. CVSS Vector String Base Metric Values 
Metric Values (V) 
Attack Vector, AV [N, A, L, P] 
Attack Complexity, AC [L, H] 
Privileges Required, PR [N, L, H] 
User Interaction, UI [N, R] 
Scope, S [U, C] 
Confidentiality, C [H, L, N] 
Integrity, I [H, L, N] 
Availability, A [H, L, N] 
A CVSS vector string is of the form [20]:  
𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑆: [𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛]/𝐴𝑉: [𝑉]/𝐴𝐶: [𝑉]/𝑃𝑅: [𝑉]/𝑈𝐼: [𝑉]/𝑆: [𝑉]/𝐶: [𝑉]/𝐼: [𝑉]/𝐴: [𝑉] 
An example of the CVSS vector string for a vulnerability with a Physical Attack Vector, 
Low Attack Complexity, None Privilege Required, Required User Interaction, Unchanged Scope, 
Low Confidentiality Impact, High Integrity Impact and None Availability Impact is: 
𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑆: 3.0/𝐴𝑉: 𝑃/𝐴𝐶: 𝐿/𝑃𝑅: 𝑁/𝑈𝐼: 𝑅/𝑆: 𝑈/𝐶: 𝐿/𝐼: 𝐻/𝐴: 𝑁 
The metrics in the vector string can be in any order according to the specification. This 
format from the specification [20] has been used throughout this document for representing the 
CVSS metrics of a vulnerability.  
The National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) [21] is one of the popular vulnerabilities 
databases that used the CVSS as a metric for the vulnerabilities reported in the database. The NVD 
is a reliable source of information that we have used for the CVSS score for several vulnerabilities 
in this research.  
For the security vulnerabilities not available in the database, the CVSS vector can be 
determined by analyzing the vulnerability and the CVSS score can be calculated using the formula 
described in the following section. 
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 CVSS Calculation 
Given a CVSS vector, the CVSS score can be calculated using the CVSS Calculator [22]. 
The calculation is based on the numerical values and the formulas defined in the CVSS 
specification. There are formulas defined for the temporal and environmental metrics in the 
specification. This study uses only the base metrics for simplicity. 
In the specification [20], the Base Score is defined as a function of Impact Sub-Score (ISC) 
and Exploitability Sub-Score (ESC).  
The ISC is calculated as follows [20]: 
 𝐼𝑆𝐶 = {
6.42 ∗ 𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒    (𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑)
7.52 ∗  [𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 0.029] −  3.25 ∗ [𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 0.02]
15 (𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑)
 
Where,  
𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 1 − [(1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓) ∗  (1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔) ∗  (1 − 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙) 
The ESC is calculated as follows: 
𝐸𝑆𝐶 = 8.22 ∗ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑉𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
The Base Score is calculated as follows [20]: 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  {
0 [𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑆𝐶 ≤ 0]
𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(min(𝐼𝑆𝐶 + 𝐸𝑆𝐶, 10)) [𝑖𝑓  𝐼𝑆𝐶 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑈𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑]
𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(min(1.08 ∗ (𝐼𝑆𝐶 + 𝐸𝑆𝐶), 10))[𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑆𝐶 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑]
 
The metric values (from the Table 16 of the specification [20]) can be found in table below: 
 Table 2. CVSS Metric Values 
Metric Metric Value Numerical Value 
















0.62 (0.68 if Scope is Changed) 
0.27 (0.50 if Scope is Changed) 














These metric values are used later during the calculation of CVSS for the issues detected by 
the tools. 
2.4 Security Vulnerability Analysis 
There have been numerous efforts for detection of vulnerabilities in Android apps. A lot of 
research has been done be security experts, and different tools have been developed for detecting 
vulnerabilities in the Android applications.  
There are three major categories of tools for detecting security vulnerabilities: 
1. Static Code Analysis Tools: These tools analyze the bytecode or the source code of the 
apps without executing the code. These tools generally perform quick analysis, but due 
to lack of visibility of data, they may contain large number of false positives. Qark [23], 
Androbugs [24], MobSF [25], and JAADAS [26] are some of the generic static open 
source tools available to be used for static analysis of Android apps.  
2. Static Taint Analysis Tools: Taint Analysis Tools are specialized static analysis tools 
that detect information leakage. They track every data from every possible source all the 
way through to the sinks (where the data is used). These tools are specialized at finding 
the data leakages, but cannot detect other kinds of security vulnerabilities such as 
vulnerabilities related to the SSL, Web, permissions, etc. Flowdroid [27], DroidSafe 
[28], and Amandroid [29] are some examples of static analysis that are used for taint 
analysis of Android apps. 
3. Dynamic Code Analysis Tools: Dynamic Analysis Tools run the analysis during or after 
execution of the code. They are capable of providing much more visibility and details 
to the vulnerabilities being detected, but they take a longer time to execute and can miss 
the vulnerabilities that were not triggered during the execution of the code. MobSF [25], 




 Benchmarking of Tools 
Besides development of tools, there have been efforts to analyze the effectiveness of the 
tools, and several benchmarks have been created for such analysis. The various benchmarks that 
were considered are discussed below. 
The Ghera Android Vulnerabilities benchmark [7] provides source code for the benign app, 
malicious app and the secure app for each benchmark. The Benign app is the version of the 
application that exhibits the vulnerability, the malicious app is the application that exploits the 
vulnerability in the benign app, and the secure app is the application with the security vulnerability 
removed from the benign app. Each benchmark also provides a summary of the vulnerability along 
with the affected Android versions and description and example of the vulnerability being 
demonstrated through the benign and the secure apps. The Ghera benchmark has a total of 60 
benchmarks categorized into seven groups – Cryptography, Inter-Component Communication 
(ICC), Networking, Non-API, Permission, Storage, System, and Web. 
Damn Insecure and Vulnerable App (DIVA) [28] is an app that contains insecure and 
vulnerable code. It was originally intended as a learning tool for Android developers to understand 
different security vulnerabilities, but it has been used by security professionals for penetration 
testing. It includes various challenges such as insecure logging, hardcoding issues, insecure data 
storage, input validation issues, access control issues, etc. [28] 
Purposefully Insecure and Vulnerable Android Application (PIVAA) [29] is another 
insecure and vulnerable app that was designed as an improvement over the outdated DIVA. It 
covers the following vulnerabilities [29]: 
• Usage of Weak Initialization vector 
• Possible Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attack 
• Remote URL load in WebView 
• Object Deserialization on Untrusted Resource 
• User-Supplied Input in SQL queries 
• Missing Tapjacking Protection 
• Enabled Application Backup 
• Enabled Debug Mode 
• Weak Encryption 
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• Hardcoded Encryption Keys 
• Dynamic Code Loading 
• Creation of World Readable or Writable Files 
• Usage of Unencrypted HTTP Protocol 
• Weak Hashing Algorithms 
• Predictable Random Number Generation 
• Exported Android Components 
• JS enabled in a WebView 
• Temporary File Creation 
• Hardcoded Insecure Data 
• Untrusted Certificate Authorities (CA) Acceptance 
• Usage of banned API functions 
• Self-Signed Certificate Authority (CA) enabled in Webview 
• Cleartext SQLite Database 
DroidBench [30] is a micro-benchmark designed to evaluate the effectiveness of Android 
taint-analysis tools. It comprises of 120 test cases for data leakage in Android apps. The test cases 
cover the leakages related to Java (such as Arrays and Lists, Callbacks, Reflection) and Android 
APIs (such as Lifecycle, Inter-App Communication, Inter-Component Communication).  
ICC-Bench [31] is a more specialized repository of benchmark apps focused towards Inter-
Component data leakage in Android apps. It consists of 24 small apps representing various 
vulnerabilities related to ICC. 
DialDroid-Bench [32] is another benchmark focused towards the Android taint-analysis 
tools that consists of 30 real world applications. It only consists of the apk files without any source 
code or vulnerability details making it difficult to put it into use for analysis of the tools. 
This research chooses to use the Ghera benchmark over the other benchmark for several 
reasons. First, the Ghera benchmark covers a wider range of issues than other benchmarks across 
several categories. It covers a broader range of issues than the benchmarks such as DroidBench, 
ICC-Bench, DialDroid-Bench, which are focused towards the taint analysis tools. Secondly, the 
Ghera benchmark consists of micro-benchmarks that makes it easier to look at each issue 
separately. Though DIVA and PIVAA also represent categories that focuses issues not just related 
to the taint analysis, they contain all the errors in a single application. This makes the analysis 
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difficult because it is difficult to verify if the issue is reported correctly. Lastly, the Ghera 
benchmark also provides good documentation of the issues and a version of the benchmark app 
with the issue fixed. This is particularly useful because it helps to recognize the false negatives 
reported by the tools. 
2.5 Trust and Subjective Logic 
Trust is the measurement of the degree of belief or disbelief of one entity towards another 
entity. In the thesis, our trust is related to the security of the android application. The trust of an 
application is based on the evidences gathered using different static analysis tools. 
We are using Subjective Logic to represent the trust for the application. The subjective logic 
is a probabilistic model created by Jøsang [8] which defines an agent’s opinion of a system in 
terms of belief, disbelief and uncertainty. We are using this opinion in terms of trustworthiness 
developed through the evidences gathered.  
In traditional probabilistic model, we can consider a proposition is considered to be binary 
(either it is true or false). Subjective Logic takes into account the factor of uncertainty that we 
encounter in the real world. Subjective Logic proposes a belief model. The trust of a system is 
defined using ω = (b, d, u) tuple where the values b, d and u represent the belief, disbelief and 
uncertainty. An important property similar to traditional probabilistic model is that the sum of b, 
d, and u is always 1. 
Jøsang has also described various operators [8] for combining the opinions from different 
sources. The operators are as follows: 
• Conjunction: It is used to combine opinion of an agent about two different subjects using 
conjunction (“and” operation). Suppose that ωx = (bx, dx, ux) is an opinion that app x can 
be trusted and ωy = (by, dy, uy) is an opinion that app y can be trusted. Then the opinion 
that both app x and app y can be trusted is represented as ωx  y = (bx  y, dx  y, ux  y) such 
that 
 𝑏𝑥  𝑦 = 𝑏𝑥𝑏𝑦 (Eq 1) 
 𝑑𝑥  𝑦 = 𝑑𝑥+𝑑𝑦 − 𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦 (Eq 2) 
 𝑢𝑥  𝑦 = 𝑏𝑥𝑢𝑦+𝑢𝑥𝑏𝑦 + 𝑢𝑥𝑢𝑦 (Eq 3) 
 
28 
• Disjunction: It is used to combine opinion of an agent about two different subjects using 
disjunction (“or” operation). Suppose that ωx = (bx, dx, ux) is an opinion that app x can be 
trusted and ωy = (by, dy, uy) is an opinion that app y can be trusted. Then the opinion that 
either app x or app y can be trusted is represented as ωx  y = (bx  y, dx  y, ux  y) such that 
 𝑏𝑥  𝑦 = 𝑏𝑥 + 𝑏𝑦−𝑏𝑥𝑏𝑦 (Eq 4) 
 𝑑𝑥  𝑦 = 𝑑𝑥𝑑𝑦 (Eq 5) 
 𝑢𝑥  𝑦 = 𝑑𝑥𝑢𝑦+𝑢𝑥𝑑𝑦 + 𝑢𝑥𝑢𝑦 (Eq 6) 
• Negation: It is a unary operation that represents an opinion being false. Suppose that ωx 
= (bx, dx, ux) is an opinion that app x can be trusted. Then the opinion that the app x cannot 
be trusted is represented as ωx = (bx, dx, ux) such that 
 𝑏𝑥 = 𝑑𝑥 (Eq 7) 
 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑏𝑥 (Eq 8) 
 𝑢𝑥 = 𝑢𝑥 (Eq 9) 
• Discounting (): Discounting operation is used for chaining operations. Suppose that 
ωxt = (bxt, dxt, uxt) is an opinion that app x can be trusted according to evidences from tool 
t, and ωt = (bt, dt, ut) represent an opinion that the tool t can be trusted. Then the overall 
opinion that the app x can be trusted given the opinion about tool t can be represented as 
ωx = ωt  ωxt = (bx, dx, ux) such that 
 𝑏𝑥 = 𝑏𝑡𝑏𝑥
𝑡  (Eq 10) 
 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑑𝑡𝑑𝑥
𝑡  (Eq 11) 
 𝑢𝑥 = 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡𝑢𝑥
𝑡  (Eq 12) 
• Consensus Operator (): The consensus operator is an operator that is used to combine 
opinions from two different agents. The consensus operator tries to reduce the 
uncertainty by combining two opinions. Suppose ωt1 = (bt1, dt1, ut1) and ωt2 = (bt2, dt2, ut2) 
are the opinions that an app x can be trusted according two tools. Then the combined 















  where  
 =  𝑢𝑡1 + 𝑢𝑡2 − 𝑢𝑡1𝑢𝑡2 (Eq 16) 
The conjunction, disjunction and consensus operators can be applied in any order since 
they are commutative and associative. 
Jøsang [33] has also proposed on Ordering operation to sort different opinions to order 
opinions about different agents. Given two applications, the application that can be trusted more 
is the application that has the highest (b + u) / (b + d + 2u) if the values are equal, else the 
application with the lowest uncertainty u. We can use this comparison logic to order arbitrary 
number of applications. 
For weighted consensus, Zhou et. al. [34] have proposed a cumulative weighted fusion 
operator. Given ωe1 = (be1, de1, ue1) and ωe2 = (be2, de2, ue2) from two different set of evidences with 
weights  and  respectively, we can use the fusion operator to calculate the combined opinion as 
ωx = (bx, dx, ux) such that 
 
𝑏𝑥 =
( − 𝑢𝑒1𝑢𝑒2)( 𝑏𝑒1𝑢𝑒2 +  𝑏𝑒2𝑢𝑒1)





( − 𝑢𝑒1𝑢𝑒2)( 𝑑𝑒1𝑢𝑒2 +  𝑑𝑒2𝑢𝑒1)








 =  𝑢𝑡1 + 𝑢𝑡2 − 𝑢𝑡1𝑢𝑡2 (Eq 20) 
The values of ue1 and ue1 cannot be 0 or 1 for using this operator because denominator will 
be equal to 0. 
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Ceolin et. al. [35] have proposed the formula for calculating the subjective logic opinion 















𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑛
 (Eq 23) 
 
where n is indicates cardinality of the set of possible outcomes.  
This study uses the value of n as 2 because our opinion about an app is to either trust it or 
not trust it based on the evidences.  
2.6 Rank Correlation 
Kendall Tau’s rank correlation [36] is one of the popular methods to measure the degree of 
correlation between two ranking schemes. Kendall Tau distance is calculated by counting the 






 (Eq 24) 
where nc is the number of concordant pairs and nd is the number of discordant pairs.  
 (𝑛
2
) =  
𝑛(𝑛−1)
2
 is the binomial coefficient for the number of ways to choose two out of n 
items. 
To address ties in the rankings, different versions of Kendall Tau have been proposed over 
the years. The “tau-b” version accounts for ties and is defined as: 
 𝜏 =
𝑛𝑐 − 𝑛𝑑
√(𝑛𝑐 +  𝑛𝑑 + 𝑇)(𝑛𝑐 +  𝑛𝑑 + 𝑇)
 (Eq 25) 




SciPy library for Python language provides the method for calculating the Kendall Tau’s 
correlation [37]. 
Kendall Tau’s correlation has been used in the study to compare rankings generated by 
different schemes and tools. 
2.7 Related Work 
There has not been a lot of work in the research community to rank and compare Android 
applications. The ratings and reviews provided by the App Stores are used by most users to select 
their applications. Google Play does not provide a universal ranking methodology of android apps, 
but rather suggests apps based on user’s preferences and history.  
There are third-party organizations like AppBrain [40], and AppAnnie [3] that provide 
ranking of Android apps based on factors such as ratings, number of downloads, active users, etc. 
They either use a single metric or do not specify the calculation that was performed for calculating 
the ranking of apps. 
Besides these, there are few other works that have focused towards ranking of Android 
apps in the research community.  
Chowdhury et. al. [38] have proposed a ranking scheme based on the internal and external 
views of apps. They have used FindBugs, a static analysis tools for Java code, to perform the 
evaluation of internal view, and used sentiment analysis on the ratings to calculate the external 
rating. They propose a method to combine these two views for a holistic evaluation of the Android 
apps. This paper builds on a previous research [39] where a ranking scheme has been proposed 
based on the results of Findbugs, and shows disparity between the findings and the ratings and 
reviews provided by the users. In another paper [40], they have proposed another ranking scheme 
that takes security into consideration. They have evaluated apps based on the results of FlowDroid, 
and text analysis of security concerns from the user reviews. This thesis borrows many concepts 
from these papers but taking a more detailed approach on evaluating the security of the apps. 
Gallege et. al. [44] have also proposed a parallel approach for selecting and recommending the 
apps available in online marketplaces. 
Aside from the efforts in ranking applications, there have been many studies for evaluating 
the analysis tools themselves. 
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Qiu et. al. [41] have performed an analysis between the static taint analysis tools FlowDroid, 
AmanDroid and DroidSafe. They have performed the comparison using the DroidBench and ICC-
Bench Benchmark Suites. In this research, we have performed a similar analysis for generic static 
analysis tools that were used. 
Pauck et. al. [42] have performed an empirical evaluation on the static taint analysis tools 
used in the research community. They have used the DroidBench [30] to perform the analysis on 
six different tools. They have also proposed ReproDroid framework to perform an accurate and 
reproducable evaluation of the static analysis tools to overcome the differences in the evaluation 
techniques used by the authors of the tools. 
A survey of android security threats and defenses was conducted by Rashidi et. al. [43]. 
Many of the threats identified are still relevant, whereas some have become outdated. There were 
several tools gathered in the survey, but none of the tools fit the needs of this research. 
In this chapter, we have introduced all the background and theory required for our proposed 
approach. We have borrowed many concepts from the related work and tried to overcome some of 
their shortcomings in our research.   
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 PROPOSED APPROACH 
This chapter proposes different ranking schemes that are used in our analysis. It also 
describes the dataset and the selection of tools. Finally, a detailed analysis of the capabilities of 
the tools used on our study is presented. 
3.1 Ranking Scheme 
A generic framework for the ranking of the android apps is show in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Generic Ranking Framework 
Given a set of n applications, the framework should return them as an ordered set of apps 
by calculating their ranks based on the evidences gathered from the various static analysis tools. 
The schemes take the apk files as input and generate a subjective opinion on the applications. The 
ordering operation of subjective logic is then used as a ranking algorithm on these subjective logic 
opinions to get the ranks of the applications. 
This study proposes three different base schemes to generate the subjective opinions on the 
trustworthiness of the applications. Each static analysis tools in our experiment are used in these 
schemes to gather the evidences and generate opinions. Two more schemes are proposed for 
combining the opinions from different static analysis tools.  The schemes are discussed in more 
detail in the subsections below. 
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 Base Scheme based on the categories of evidences (B1) 
The first scheme uses the categories of good practices and security vulnerabilities that are 
reported by the tools. 
 
Figure 3. Base Scheme based on categories of evidences (B1) 
All the static analysis tools generate different categories of evidences. Each category 
representing good practice is treated as positive evidence, and each potential security vulnerability 
is treated as negative evidence. The BDU calculator uses the count of positive and negative 
categories of evidences to output the subjective logic tuple ω using equations 21-23. 
The ranking generated by this scheme will represent the trustworthiness of applications 
based on the different kinds of vulnerabilities that may be present in the application. 
 Base Scheme based on the frequency of evidences (B2)  
The second base scheme considers the frequency of occurrence of each category of the 
evidences. 
 
Figure 4. Base Scheme based on the frequency of evidences (B2) 
In this scheme, the different categories of evidences along with the frequency of the 
occurrences of each of the findings are collected. Given the category and its count, the subjective 
logic can be used to calculate subjective logic tuples (ωe1, ωe2, … ωen) using equations 21-23 where 
the count is used as the number of positive/negative evidence. These opinions for different 
categories of evidences can be combined using the consensus operator (given by equations 13-16) 
to give the final opinion ω of the scheme. 
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The ranking generated by this scheme takes into consideration the number of attack surfaces 
present in the application. 
 Base Scheme based on the severity of evidences (B3)  
Besides the frequency of the evidences, the severity of each evidence could be an important 
metric for ranking the applications. This scheme adds weights to the consensus operation used in 
scheme B2. 
 
Figure 5. Base Scheme based on the severity of evidences (B3) 
The static analysis tools return the frequency of each evidence. In addition to the frequency, 
a weight representing the severity of evidences is calculated for each evidence. 
To calculate the severity of evidences, we explored various approaches. We tried to assign 
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [5] to each evidence, but the enumerations were not 
available for all the evidences reported by the tools. Another approach was to use the OWASP 
Mobile Top 10 [4], but the ten categories were broad and the vulnerabilities within each category 
could have different severity. On the other hand, the CVSS score could be calculated separately 
for each evidences, and it provided a wholesome score based on various factors such as attack 
vector, attack complexity, scope, impact (confidentiality, integrity, availability), etc. that we have 
already discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Thus, we decided to use the CVSS as the weight for this 
scheme. 
The consensus operator in the base scheme (B2) can be replaced with a weighted consensus 
operator using the calculated weight. The weighted consensus operator is given by equations 17-
20. 




 Consensus Scheme treating each tool equally (C1) 
One of the ways of combining the opinions is to treat each tool equally. The scheme can 
be represented as shown below. 
 
Figure 6. Consensus Scheme treating each tool equally (C1) 
This scheme can utilize any of the base schemes to get the opinions from the different tools 
and use the consensus operator (equation 13-16) to combine the results. 
 Consensus Scheme based on the trust of the tools (C2) 
This scheme adds the trust of the tools as an additional factor. The results of running the 
benchmarks can be used to calculate the trust of the tools. The trust is discussed in detail in Section 
4.1. Assuming the trust of tools are known, the discounting operator (equation 10-12) can be used 




Figure 7. Consensus Scheme using the trust of tools (C2) 
3.2 Dataset 
The dataset consists of 175 applications from 7 different categories. The apk files were 
downloaded from APKPure [44]. The categories and number of applications in each category is 
listed in table below. 
Table 3. Dataset Count 










Each category consists of applications with similar functionality. For example, the games 
are all 2048 puzzles, tools are all scientific calculators, photography apps are all photo editors. 
Having similar functionality will results in a fair comparison and ranking of applications.  
The five categories have 5 applications are used for a detailed analysis of the ranking 
schemes. The three other categories having a larger application set are used to verify our initial 
analysis and to calculate correlation between different schemes and tools.  
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3.3 Tools Selection 
For the selection of tools, we focused on generic static analysis tools that covers many 
aspects related to the security of the tools. The taint analysis tools are focused only towards data 
leakages are were not considered. Dynamic code analysis tools take a long time for analysis and 
may not cover all execution paths. Among the potential tools identified, JAADAS [26] result in 
error for the analysis of most of the applications. MobSF [25], AndroBugs Framework [24], and 
QARK [23] were the tools that were tested against various application and could run successfully. 
Thus, we are using these three tools for our analysis.  
3.4 Tool Analysis 
All the tools used in this study have different formats for input, output, and storing results. 
In this section we are exploring the capabilities of the tools for detecting various kinds of good 
practices and vulnerabilities. 
 MobSF 
MobSF provides a user interface to upload apk files and perform a detailed analysis on the 
apk file. It displays the analysis results in the web app but it can also return the results in json 
format through Rest API. It can also perform analysis on iOS applications. 
MobSF extracts all the metadata of the apk including the name, package name, the launcher 
activity, minimum SDK, maximum SDK, version code and version name. It also tracks the 
manifest along with all the activities, services, receiver, and providers for the app. It performs 
various kinds of security analysis such as checking signer certificate, checking permissions, binary 
analysis, manifest analysis, code analysis, file analysis, and malware analysis. It also allows 
dynamic analysis on the apps. 
Among the analysis that the tool provides, the manifest analysis, and code analysis contain 
the results of the static analysis related to most of the security vulnerabilities. Other analysis did 
not provide any significant evidences that could be used in our calculations. 
In the following sections we look at the code analysis and manifest analysis done by the 




The code analysis returns the good practices and potential vulnerabilities in the application 
code. The tool is capable of finding 46 different categories of security evidences. The findings are 
categorized as one of the following four levels: 
• good (16 categories) 
• info (4 categories) 
• warning (5 categories) 
• high (21 categories) 
The good practices found by the code analysis are always reported under the ‘good’ level. The 
other categories represent the security vulnerabilities. 
Although the three levels (high, info, warning) for the vulnerabilities seem to represent the 
severity of the vulnerability, a detailed of the analysis of the type of evidences indicates that it is 
not true. It seems to be representing the likelihood of the finding to be an actual security 
vulnerability. For example, among the findings reported by MobSF [25], “Insecure WebView 
Implementation. Execution of user controlled code in WebView is a critical Security Hole.” has a 
warning level, but it is of a high severity vulnerability, and “App creates temp file. Sensitive 
information should never be written into a temp file.” has a high level, but the severity is not as 
high. Thus, it is preferable to treat all the three levels equally and analyze each category of evidence 
for its severity using other metrics such as CVSS. 
Manifest Analysis 
The manifest rules are defined under the tool’s source code defines 45 categories with a 
code, title, name, level, and description for each category. But the results returned after analysis 
does not contain the code which is the unique value for the categories. Several code sets have the 




Table 4. MobSF Manifest categories from source code (from [25]) 
Code Name 
a_allowbackup_miss Application Data can be Backed up [android:allowBackup] 
flag is missing. 
a_allowbackup Application Data can be Backed up 
[android:allowBackup=true] 
a_testonly Application is in Test Mode [android:testOnly=true] 
a_dailer_code Dailer Code: Found 
<br>[android:scheme="android_secret_code"] 
a_sms_receiver_port Data SMS Receiver Set on Port: Found<br>[android:port] 
a_debuggable Debug Enabled For App [android:debuggable=true] 
a_high_action_priority High Action Priority [android:priority] 
a_high_intent_priority High Intent Priority [android:priority] 
a_improper_provider Improper Content Provider Permissions 
a_not_protected is not Protected. [android:exported=true] 
c_not_protected is not Protected.[[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] 
a_not_protected_filter is not Protected.An intent-filter exists. 
c_prot_unknown_appl is Protected by a permission at application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be checked.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] 
c_prot_normal_new_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level should be 
checked, but the protection level of the permission if the 
application runs on a device where the the API level is less 
than 17.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
c_prot_unknown_new_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be checked  if the 
application runs on a device where the the API level is less 






Table 4. Continued 
c_prot_dangter_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be checked if the 
application runs on a device where the the API level is less 
than 17.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
a_prot_danger_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be 
checked.[android:exported=true] 
a_prot_normal_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be 
checked.[android:exported=true] 
a_prot_sign_sys_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be 
checked.[android:exported=true] 
c_prot_danger_new is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be checked.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] 
c_prot_normal_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be checked.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] 
c_prot_sign_sys_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be checked.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] 
c_prot_sign_sys_new_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the 
protection level of the permission should be checked.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
c_prot_sign_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level.[Content 





Table 4. Continued 
c_prot_sign_new_appl is Protected by a permission at the application level.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
a_prot_unknown_appl is Protected by a permission at the application, but the 
protection level of the permission should be 
checked.[android:exported=true] 
c_prot_unknown_new is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked  if the application runs on a 
device where the the API level is less than 17.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
c_prot_normal_new is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked if the application runs on a 
device where the the API level is less than 17 [Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
c_prot_danger_new_appl is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked if the application runs on a 
device where the the API level is less than 17.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
a_prot_danger is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[android:exported=true] 
a_prot_normal is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[android:exported=true] 
a_prot_sign_sys is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[android:exported=true] 
a_prot_unknown is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[android:exported=true] 
c_prot_danger is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[Content Provider, 
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c_prot_normal is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] 
c_prot_sign_sys is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] 
c_prot_unknown is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] 
c_prot_sign_sys_new is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
a_prot_sign is Protected by a permission.[android:exported=true] 
c_prot_sign is Protected by a permission.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] 
c_prot_sign_new is Protected by a permission.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
a_launchmode Launch Mode of Activity is not standard. 
a_prot_sign_appl Protected by a permission at the application 
level.[android:exported=true] 
a_taskaffinity TaskAffinity is set for Activity 
c_not_protected2 would not be Protected if the application ran on a device 
where the the API level was less than 17.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
 
The common names used for multiple codes are as follows: 
• “c_prot_unknown_new_appl” and “c_prot_danger_appl” codes both have the name “is 
Protected by a permission at the application level should be checked, but the protection 
level of the permission if the application runs on a device where the the API level is less 
than 17.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17]”.  
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• “a_prot_danger_appl”, “a_prot_normal_appl”, and “a_prot_sign_sys_appl” all have the 
name “is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[android:exported=true]”. 
• “c_prot_danger_new”, “c_prot_normal_appl”, and “c_prot_sys_appl” all have the name 
“is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the protection level of the 
permission should be checked.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17]”. 
• “c_prot_unknwon_new”, “c_prot_normal_new” and “c_prot_danger_new_appl” all have 
the name “is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the permission should 
be checked  if the application runs on a device where the the API level is less than 
17.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17]”. 
• “a_prot_danger”, “a_prot_normal”, “a_prot_sign_sys”, and “a_prot_unknown” all have 
the name “is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the permission should 
be checked.[android:exported=true]”. 
• “c_prot_danger”, “c_prot_normal”, “c_prot_sign_sys”, and “c_prot_unknown” all have 
the name “is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the permission should 
be checked.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17]”. 
After removing the duplicates, we marked each finding as a “vulnerability” or a “good 
practice”. Though the tool provides “high”, “medium” and “info” levels, the “info” level finding 
may be a “vulnerability” or a “good practice”. The final dataset consists of 32 categories out of 
which 6 are good practices and 26 vulnerabilities as represented in Table 5 (where the “Name” 




Table 5. Final List of findings for MobSF Manifest Analysis 
Name Type 
Application Data can be Backed up [android:allowBackup] flag is missing. vulnerability 
Application Data can be Backed up [android:allowBackup=true] vulnerability 
Application is in Test Mode [android:testOnly=true] vulnerability 
Dailer Code: Found <br>[android:scheme="android_secret_code"] vulnerability 
Data SMS Receiver Set on Port: Found<br>[android:port] vulnerability 
Debug Enabled For App [android:debuggable=true] vulnerability 
High Action Priority [android:priority] vulnerability 
High Intent Priority [android:priority] vulnerability 
Improper Content Provider Permissions vulnerability 
is not Protected. [android:exported=true] vulnerability 
is not Protected.[[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] vulnerability 
is not Protected.An intent-filter exists. vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission at application level, but the protection level of 
the permission should be checked.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion < 
17] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission at the application level should be checked, but 
the protection level of the permission if the application runs on a device 
where the the API level is less than 17.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion 
>= 17] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the protection level 
of the permission should be checked if the application runs on a device 
where the the API level is less than 17.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion 
>= 17] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the protection level 
of the permission should be checked.[android:exported=true] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the protection level 
of the permission should be checked.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion < 
17] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission at the application level, but the protection level 
of the permission should be checked.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion 
>= 17] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission at the application level.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] good 
is Protected by a permission at the application level.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion >= 17] good 
is Protected by a permission at the application, but the protection level of 
the permission should be checked.[android:exported=true] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the permission 
should be checked if the application runs on a device where the the API 




Table 5. Continued 
is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the permission 
should be checked.[android:exported=true] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the permission 
should be checked.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission, but the protection level of the permission 
should be checked.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] vulnerability 
is Protected by a permission.[android:exported=true] good 
is Protected by a permission.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] good 
is Protected by a permission.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] good 
Launch Mode of Activity is not standard. vulnerability 
Protected by a permission at the application level.[android:exported=true] good 
TaskAffinity is set for Activity vulnerability 
would not be Protected if the application ran on a device where the the API 
level was less than 17.[Content Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] vulnerability 
 AndroBugs 
AndroBugs is a command line tool that can perform fast analysis on large number of 
applications. It is a Python program that provides various commands to perform analysis on a 
single apk or a set of apk files. It provides commands to display the results in command line and 
also outputs the results into text files. It internally uses MongoDB to store the results. We are 
leveraging this database directly to query the analysis results. 
AndroBugs reports 51 different categories of finding with four levels (info, warning, 
critical, and notice). Instead of reporting only the findings it returns all 51 categories, and uses 
“info” level to notify the absence of the category. “Warning” and “Category” represent the various 
types vulnerabilities. The “Notice” level can have a generic notice that is neither a good practice, 
nor a vulnerability, or it can also report good practices and vulnerabilities. After manually 
categorizing the “Notice” level we obtain a total of 38 categories as vulnerabilities, 2 categories as 
generic messages (that can be ignored during analysis) and 11 categories as good practices as 
















































FRAMEWORK_MONODROID generic notice 
MANIFEST_GCM generic notice 
DB_SEE good practice 
DB_SQLCIPHER good practice 
DB_SQLITE_JOURNAL good practice 
HACKER_DB_KEY good practice 
HACKER_DEBUGGABLE_CHECK good practice 
HACKER_INSTALL_SOURCE_CHECK good practice 
HACKER_KEYSTORE_LOCATION1 good practice 
HACKER_KEYSTORE_SSL_PINNING good practice 
HACKER_PREVENT_SCREENSHOT_CHECK good practice 
HACKER_SIGNATURE_CHECK good practice 






Qark is a static analysis tool that detects security vulnerabilities in Android apps. It is 
programmed in Python and provides a command line interface. It can analyze both source code 
and apk files. It reports the results in html or json format. Each finding reports the name, category, 
line number, severity (error/vulnerability/info/warning), description, and the file where the 
vulnerability was detected. It is not capable of detecting good practices. We are not using the 
severity from the tool but instead calculating our own severity based on CVSS. 
Qark does not enlist the vulnerabilities it detects, so we had to manually extract it from the 
source code. A total of 45 vulnerabilities that could be detected were identified. The vulnerabilities 
along with the CVSS scores are listed in the CVSS calculation section later. 
3.5 CVSS Calculation 
Since we are using the CVSS score as a weight on ranking scheme based on the severity of 
evidences, we calculate the CVSS for the different findings reported by the tools. CVSS scores are 
usually assigned for the security vulnerabilities discovered by security experts separately for each 
specific app. Instead, we are assigning a generic score depending on the description and 
vulnerabilities reported on the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [21].  
The CVSS is not used in general for good practices, but to add weights to good practices, 
we are assigning the CVSS scores for good practices based on the vulnerability it tries to prevent. 
If there is a vulnerability V with a CVSS score X, we assign a good practice G that prevents V the 
same score X. 
The CVSS calculations for the different tools are discussed in detail in the following 
subsections below. 
 MobSF 
The MobSF provides the CVSS score for 23 out of 46 Code Analysis findings. The defined 
findings are listed in Table 7 (extracted, and reported verbatim below, from MobSF [25]). For the 
23 rest static analysis findings (extracted, and reported verbatim below, from MobSF [25]), the 
CVSS scores were calculated as shown in Table 8. 
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Table 7. CVSS Scores Provided by MobSF [25] 
Finding CVSS 
App can read/write to External Storage. Any App can read data written to External 
Storage. 5.5 
App can write to App Directory. Sensitive Information should be encrypted. 3.9 
App creates temp file. Sensitive information should never be written into a temp file. 5.5 
App uses SQLite Database and execute raw SQL query. Untrusted user input in raw 
SQL queries can cause SQL Injection. Also sensitive information should be encrypted 
and written to the database. 5.9 
Files may contain hardcoded sensitive informations like usernames, passwords, keys 
etc. 7.4 
Hidden elements in view can be used to hide data from user. But this data can be leaked 4.3 
Insecure Implementation of SSL. Trusting all the certificates or accepting self-signed 
certificates is a critical Security Hole. This application is vulnerable to MITM attacks 7.4 
Insecure WebView Implementation. Execution of user controlled code in WebView is 
a critical Security Hole. 8.8 
Insecure WebView Implementation. WebView ignores SSL Certificate errors and 
accept any SSL Certificate. This application is vulnerable to MITM attacks 7.4 
IP Address disclosure 4.3 
MD5 is a weak hash known to have hash collisions. 7.4 
Remote WebView debugging is enabled. 5.4 
SHA-1 is a weak hash known to have hash collisions. 5.9 
The App logs information. Sensitive information should never be logged. 7.5 
The App may use weak IVs like "0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00" or 
"0x01,0x02,0x03,0x04,0x05,0x06,0x07". Not using a random IV makes the resulting 
ciphertext much more predictable and susceptible to a dictionary attack. 9.8 






Table 7. Continued 
The App uses ECB mode in Cryptographic encryption algorithm. ECB mode is 
known to be weak as it results in the same ciphertext for identical blocks of plaintext. 5.9 
The file is World Readable and Writable. Any App can read/write to the file 6 
The file is World Readable. Any App can read from the file 4 
The file is World Writable. Any App can write to the file 6 
This App uses Java Hash Code. It's a weak hash function and should never be used 
in Secure Crypto Implementation. 2.3 
This App uses RSA Crypto without OAEP padding. The purpose of the padding 
scheme is to prevent a number of attacks on RSA that only work when the encryption 
is performed without padding. 5.9 
Weak Hash algorithm used 7.4 
WebView load files from external storage. Files in external storage can be modified 





Table 8. Calculated CVSS for MobSF Code Analysis 
Finding Vector CVS
S 
These activities prevent screenshot 




This App uses SQL Cipher. But the 









This App uses SQL Cipher. 
SQLCipher provides 256-bit AES 




This app listens to Clipboard 
changes. Some malwares also listen 




This App copies data to clipboard. 
Sensitive data should not be copied 





This App detects frida server. CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I
:L/A:L 
5.5 
This App uses an SSL Pinning 
Library 
(org.thoughtcrime.ssl.pinning) to 





This App has capabilities to prevent 
against Screenshots from Recent 
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This App may uses Safenet API. CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H
/A:L 
5.4 
The App mayuse package signature 




DexGuard Signer Certificate  




DexGuard App Tamper Detection 









DexGuard code to detect weather the 
App  is signed with a debug key or 














This App download files using 




DexGuard Debug Detection code to 
detect wheather an App is 







Similarly, the calculated CVSS score for Manifest Analysis for each finding (extracted, 
and reported verbatim below, from MobSF [25]) is shown below: 
Table 9. Calculated CVSS for MobSF Manifest Analysis 
Findings Vector CVSS 
Application Data can be Backed up 
[android:allowBackup] flag is missing. 
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N
/A:N 4.4 





















High Action Priority [android:priority] 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/
A:L 4.3 
High Intent Priority [android:priority] 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/
A:L 4.3 
Improper Content Provider Permissions 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A
:L 7.3 
is not Protected. [android:exported=true] 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/
A:N 6.2 
is not Protected.[[Content Provider, 







Table 9. Continued 
is not Protected.An intent-filter exists. 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:
N 6.2 
is Protected by a permission at 
application level, but the protection 
level of the permission should be 
checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:
N 4.4 
is Protected by a permission at the 
application level should be checked, but 
the protection level of the permission if 
the application runs on a device where 
the the API level is less than 




is Protected by a permission at the 
application level, but the protection 
level of the permission should be 
checked if the application runs on a 
device where the the API level is less 
than 17.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion >= 17] 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:
N 4.4 
is Protected by a permission at the 
application level, but the protection 
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is Protected by a permission at the 
application level, but the protection 
level of the permission should be 
checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.4 
is Protected by a permission at the 
application level, but the protection 
level of the permission should be 
checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion >= 17] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.4 
is Protected by a permission at the 
application level.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
is Protected by a permission at the 
application level.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion >= 17] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
is Protected by a permission at the 
application, but the protection level of 
the permission should be 
checked.[android:exported=true] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.4 
is Protected by a permission, but the 
protection level of the permission 
should be checked if the application 
runs on a device where the the API level 
is less than 17 [Content Provider, 
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is Protected by a permission, but the 
protection level of the permission 
should be 
checked.[android:exported=true] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.4 
is Protected by a permission, but the 
protection level of the permission 
should be checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion < 17] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.4 
is Protected by a permission, but the 
protection level of the permission 
should be checked.[Content Provider, 
targetSdkVersion >= 17] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.4 
is Protected by a 
permission.[android:exported=true] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
is Protected by a permission.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion < 17] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
is Protected by a permission.[Content 
Provider, targetSdkVersion >= 17] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
Launch Mode of Activity is not 
standard. CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 5.1 
Protected by a permission at the 
application 
level.[android:exported=true] CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
TaskAffinity is set for Activity CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 5.1 
would not be Protected if the 
application ran on a device where the 
the API level was less than 17.[Content 





The CVSS scores for the findings (reported by AndroBugs [24] reproduced verbatim) are 
as follows: 
Table 10. Calculated CVSS for Androbugs 
Findings Vector CVSS 
ALLOW_BACKUP CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.4 
COMMAND CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L 7.3 
COMMAND_MAYBE_SYSTEM CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H 8.2 
DB_DEPRECATED_USE1 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L 5.6 
DB_SEE CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 6.1 
DB_SQLCIPHER CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 6.1 
DB_SQLITE_JOURNAL CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
DEBUGGABLE CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L 4.6 
DYNAMIC_CODE_LOADING CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L 5.8 
EXTERNAL_STORAGE CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L 7.3 
FILE_DELETE CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
FRAGMENT_INJECTION CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N 9.1 
HACKER_BASE64_STRING_DECODE CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N 6.2 
HACKER_DB_KEY CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 6.1 
HACKER_DEBUGGABLE_CHECK CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L 4.6 
HACKER_INSTALL_SOURCE_CHECK CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L 5.1 
HACKER_KEYSTORE_LOCATION1 CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.4 
HACKER_KEYSTORE_NO_PWD CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
HACKER_KEYSTORE_SSL_PINNING CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
HACKER_PREVENT_SCREENSHOT_CHECK CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.1 
HACKER_SIGNATURE_CHECK CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.7 
HTTPURLCONNECTION_BUG CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 5.3 
KEYSTORE_TYPE_CHECK CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 6.1 








PERMISSION_DANGEROUS CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 8.4 
PERMISSION_EXPORTED CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 8.4 
PERMISSION_GROUP_EMPTY_VALUE CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 8.4 




PERMISSION_NO_PREFIX_EXPORTED CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H 8.4 







SENSITIVE_DEVICE_ID CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 4 
SENSITIVE_SECURE_ANDROID_ID CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 4 
SENSITIVE_SMS CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 5.3 
SHARED_USER_ID CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 5.5 
SSL_CN1 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 5.3 
SSL_CN2 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 5.3 
SSL_CN3 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 5.3 
SSL_DEFAULT_SCHEMA_NAME CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
SSL_URLS_NOT_IN_HTTPS CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
SSL_WEBVIEW CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
SSL_X509 CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
USE_PERMISSION_SYSTEM_APP CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 
WEBVIEW_ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
WEBVIEW_JS_ENABLED CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 





The findings (vulnerabilities as reported by QARK [23] reproduced verbatim) and their 
calculated CVSS are listed below: 
Table 11. Calculated CVSS for Qark 
Findings Vector CVSS 








Broadcast sent with receiverPermission 













Broadcast sent as specific user with 










Ordered broadcast sent with 





















Table 11. Continued 
Empty (return) certificate method CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N 9.1 
Unsafe implementation of 
onReceivedSslError 
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N 9.1 








ECB Cipher Usage CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N 8.2 
Encryption keys are packaged with the 
application 
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N 8.2 
RSA Cipher Usage CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N 8.2 
Random number generator is seeded 
with SecureSeed 
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 5.3 
Logging found CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.6 
Potential API Key found CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 4.6 
External storage used CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L 7.3 
File Permissions CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L 5.9 
Hardcoded HTTP url found CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 5.3 
Insecure functions found CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 4 
Phone number or IMEI detected CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 4 
Potientially vulnerable check permission 
function called 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 5.5 
Potential task hijacking CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 4 
Empty pending intent found CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 6.2 










Table 11. Continued 
Custom permissions are enabled in the 
manifest 
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 5.5 
Manifest is manually set to debug CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L 4.6 
Exported tags CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N 8.2 
Tap Jacking possible CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L 4.9 




Webview uses addJavascriptInterface 
pre-API 17 
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N 8.2 
Javascript enabled in Webview CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
BaseURL set for Webview CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N 4.3 
Remote debugging enabled in Webview CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L 7.1 
Webview enables content access CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
Webview enables file access CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 
Webview enables universal access for 
JavaScript 
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N 7.5 





 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The results from our experiments are analyzed and discussed in this chapter. First, the 
analysis of the tools on the benchmark is shown, followed by results of the ranking schemes.  
4.1 Benchmark Analysis 
The Ghera benchmark consists of 61 benchmark applications each with two versions of the 
application: benign(B) and secure(S). The vulnerability should be detected on the benign but not 
on the secure(S) app. The results of the benchmark are shown in the table below. 
Table 12. Ghera Results 






B S B S B S 
Crypto BlockCipher-ECB-
InformationExposure-Lean 
     
BlockCipher-NonRandomIV-
InformationExposure-Lean 
     
ConstantKey-ForgeryAttack-Lean      
ExposedCredentials-
InformationExposure-Lean 
     
PBE-ConstantSalt-
InformationExposure-Lean 
     
ICC DynamicRegBroadcastReceiver-
UnrestrictedAccess-Lean 
     
EmptyPendingIntent-
PrivEscalation-Lean 
     
FragmentInjection-PrivEscalation-
Lean 
     
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ICC HighPriority-ActivityHijack-Lean      
ImplicitPendingIntent-IntentHijack-
Lean 
     
InadequatePathPermission-
InformationExposure-Lean 
     
IncorrectHandlingImplicitIntent-
UnauthorizedAccess-Lean 
     
NoValidityCheckOnBroadcastMsg-
UnintendedInvocation-Lean 
     
OrderedBroadcast-DataInjection-
Lean 
     
StickyBroadcast-DataInjection-Lean      
TaskAffinity-ActivityHijack-Lean      
TaskAffinity-LauncherActivity-
Lean 
     
TaskAffinity-PhisingAttack-Lean      
TaskAffinityAndReparenting-
PhisingAndDoSAttack-Lean 
     
UnhandledException-DOS-Lean      
UnprotectedBroadcastRecv-
PrivEscalation-Lean 
     
WeakChecksOnDynamicInvocation
-DataInjection-Lean 
     
Networking CheckValidity-
InformationExposure-Lean 
     
IncorrectHostNameVerification-
MITM-Lean 
     





Table 12. Continued 
Networking InsecureSSLSocketFactory-MITM-
Lean 
     
InvalidCertificateAuthority-MITM-
Lean 
     
OpenSocket-InformationLean-Lean      
UnEncryptedSocketComm-MITM-
Lean 
     
UnpinnedCertificates-MITM-Lean      
NonAPI MergeManifest-
UnintendedBehavior-Lean 
     
OutdatedLibrary-
DirectoryTraversal-Lean 
     
Permission UnnecessaryPerms-PrivEscalation-
Lean 
     
WeakPermission-
UnauthorizedAccess-Lean 
     
Storage ExternalStorage-DataInjection-Lean      
ExternalStorage-InformationLeak-
Lean 
     
InternalStorage-DirectoryTraversal-
Lean 
     
InternalToExternalStorage-
InformationLeak-Lean 
     
SQLite-execSQL-Lean      
SQLite-RawQuery-Lean      
SQLite-SQLInjection-Lean      
System CheckCallingOrSelfPermission-
PrivilegeEscalation-Lean 
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System CheckPermission-
PrivliegeEscalation-Lean 
     
ClipboardUse-
InformationExposure-Lean 
     
DynamicCodeLoading-
CodeInjection-Lean 
     
EnforceCallingOrSelfPermission-
PrivilegeEscalation-Lean 
     
EnforcePermission-
PrivilegeEscalation 
     
UniqueIDs-IdentityLeak-Lean      
Web HttpConnection-MITM-Lean      
JavaScriptExecution-CodeInjection-
Lean 
     
UnsafeIntentURLImpl-
InformaitonExposure-Lean 
     
WebView-CookieOverwrite-Lean      
WebView-NoUserPermission-
InformationExposure-Lean 
     
WebViewAllowContentAccess-
UnauthorizedFileAccess-Lean 
     
WebViewAllowFileAccess-
UnauthorizedFileAccess-Lean 
     
WebViewIgnoreSSLWarning-
MITM-Lean 
     
WebViewInterceptRequest-MITM-
Lean 
     
WebViewLoadDataWithBaseUrl-
UnauthorizedFileAccess-Lean 




Table 12. Continued 
Web WebviewOverrideUrl-MITM-Lean      
WebviewProceed-
UnauthorizedAccess-Lean 
     
 
Qark detected the highest number (19) of the benign applications but also falsely identified 
vulnerabilities in nine of the secure application. MobSF had a similar performance, correctly 
identifying 18 and erroneously marking 9 applications. AndroBugs the lowest number (13) of 
vulnerability identifications in benign apps, but it had the just 2 false positive for secure 
applications. 
We can also see that the different tools performed well on different categories of the 
benchmark. The Qark and MobSF had most benign application detections in the ICC category, but 
MobSF had lower number of false positives for secure applications. MobSF suffers from wrongly 
identifying the secure applications in other categories while Qark performs relatively well. 
AndroBugs is good at detecting Network, Web and ICC categories which are all related to 
communication with external agents. The overall count for each categorized in Table 13.  
Each benign application identified is a true positive, and the ones failed to be identified are 
false negatives. The secure applications where the vulnerability is detected is a false negative, 





Table 13. Ghera count by category 
Category 
Qark Androbugs MobSF 
Benign Secure Benign Secure Benign Secure 
Crypto 1 0 1 1 2 1 
ICC 7 6 3 0 7 1 
Networking 3 0 4 1 2 2 
NonAPI 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Permission 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Storage 2 0 0 0 2 2 
System 3 2 1 0 1 1 
Web 3 1 3 1 3 2 
Total 19 9 13 3 18 9 
 
Table 14. Precision, Recall, and F-Score for Ghera Benchmark Results 
Tool Precision Recall F-Score 
MobSF 0.66666667 0.29508197 0.40909091 
Qark 0.67857143 0.31147541 0.42696629 
AndroBugs 0.8125 0.21311475 0.33766234 
 
To calculate the trust of the tools we treat the positively identified benign apps as positive 
evidence, and the negatively identified secure apps as negative evidences. Thus, we get ωmobsf = 
(0.6207,0.3103,0.0690), ωqark = (0.6333,0.3000,0.0667) and ωandro = (0.7222,0.1667,0.1111). 
4.2 Individual Tool Results 
In this section, we analyze the results from the three basic ranking schemes for each tool 
individually. Then, we evaluate the correlation between the rankings generated by different tools 
and different schemes. 
 MobSF Results 
The results on the 5 categories having 5 app each are show in Table 15. 
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Table 15. MobSF Summary 































































































































App 4 (0.0, 0.75, 0.25) 1 (0.0, 0.977, 0.023) 1 (0.0, 0.977, 0.023) 1 
App 5 
(0.0556, 









































We can see that the Base Scheme B1 has a lot of ties. This is expected because both 
applications may have different vulnerabilities, but the number of categories reported may be the 
same. Base Schemes B2 and B3 have similar higher values of ‘d’ because MobSF does not report 
counts for good practices. This leads to higher level of disbelief in the latter two schemes. 
The schemes B2 and B3 have similar rankings. This is due to the fact that most of the time 
some common vulnerabilities are reported for the applications. 
We can use the Kendall Tau correlation to calculate the similarity between the schemes. 
The following table demonstrates the correlation between the schemes on all the datasets including 
games, photography and tools. 
Table 16. Kendall Tau’s Correlation for MobSF 
category B1 vs B2 B2 vs B3 B3 vs B1 
finance 0.670820393 1 0.670820393 
insurance 0.4 0.948683298 0.527046277 
shopping 0.2 1 0.2 
news 0.527046277 0.948683298 0.444444444 
travel 0.707106781 1 0.707106781 
games 0.648099549 0.996512642 0.651685162 
photography 0.564841854 0.9839968 0.568855313 
tools 0.458365524 0.996450754 0.46206202 
 
We can see that the B2 and B3 schemes have very high correlation. There is also a 
correlation of the two schemes with the B1 scheme. The correlations in the finance, insurance, 
shopping and news can vary depending on the selection of the apps. The larger datasets give a 
more precise results for the similarity of rankings. 
 AndroBugs Results 




Table 17. AndroBugs Summary 
Category App BDU (B1) 
Rank 
(B1) BDU (B2) 
Rank 






















































































































































































0.9535, 0.0048) 5 
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We see results similar to the MobSF for similar reasons. The B1 scheme consists of even 
larger number of ties because the number of findings reported by AndroBugs is lower. Many 
applications could have the same number of evidences. The B2 and B3 schemes are highly 
correlated as demonstrated by the Kendall Tau’s correlation calculation in the table below. 
Table 18. Kendall Tau's Correlation for Androbugs 
category B1 vs B2 B2 vs B3 B3 vs B1 
finance 0.251976315 0.948683298 0.358568583 
insurance 0.597614305 1 0.597614305 
shopping 0.119522861 1 0.119522861 
news 0.447213595 1 0.447213595 
travel -0.816496581 1 -0.816496581 
games -0.365652197 0.948721067 -0.352139418 
photography 0.082234745 0.966503591 0.073149194 
tools -0.450951328 0.944591931 -0.437625285 
 
 
One of the things we can note here is that we see negative correlation between B1 and the 
other two schemes. 
 QARK Results 
For Qark, many of the dataset in the smaller categories resulted in an error. Thus, we could 
calculate the b, d, u value only for a subset of the data. The summary of results is demonstrated in 
the table below: 
Table 19. Qark Summary 
Category App BDU (B1) 
Rank 
(B1) BDU (B2) 
Rank 
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All the missing data are the applications for which the analysis failed. We can also see that 
the tuple values on B2 and B3 schemes are exactly the same. This is due to the fact that there are 
no good practices reported by the tool. We still see a positive correlation with the B1 scheme. This 




Table 20. Kendall Tau's Correlation for Qark 
category B1 vs B2 B2 vs B3 B3 vs B1 
finance 1 1 1 
insurance 0.816496581 1 0.816496581 
shopping 0.666666667 1 0.666666667 
news 0.912870929 1 0.912870929 
travel -0.2 1 -0.2 
games 0.640355391 1 0.640355391 
photography 0.606648847 1 0.606648847 
tools 0.703807994 1 0.703807994 
 
 Correlation of the ranks between the Tools 
Besides analyzing the correlation between the schemes, we have also analyzed the 
correlation between the tools themselves. For each scheme, we can calculate the correlations for 
the rankings generated by the various tools. 
Table 21. Correlation between rankings generated by the tools for B1 
category mobsf vs qark qark vs androbugs androbugs vs mobsf 
finance undefined -1 0.801783726 
insurance -0.816496581 0 0.358568583 
shopping 0.333333333 0.182574186 -0.358568583 
news 0.8 0.8 0.471404521 
travel 1 -0.894427191 -0.721687836 
games 0.507690657 -0.408967417 -0.305989558 
photography 0.302809776 0.004331948 0.247434671 
tools 0.579153007 -0.542180557 -0.275921074 
 
We can see that there is no significant correlation between the rankings generated. There 
is a slight negative correlation between androbugs and the other two tools. We have seen a similar 
pattern in the benchmark dataset where MobSF and Qark were reporting large number of true 
positives and false positives whereas Androbugs is returning only a smaller number of 
vulnerabilities and good practices. This scheme is similar to benchmark as it only counts the 
number of categories reported. 
 
75 
Table 22. Correlation between rankings generated by the tools for B2 
category mobsf vs qark qark vs androbugs androbugs vs mobsf 
finance 1 1 0.527046277 
insurance 0.333333333 1 0.4 
shopping 0.666666667 0.666666667 0.6 
news 0.333333333 0.666666667 0.4 
travel -0.2 -0.2 0.555555556 
games 0.658024443 0.522747551 0.585155824 
photography 0.533408653 0.25033483 0.293323024 
tools 0.557796088 0.367218452 0.305415481 
 
We can see that when the frequency of the findings is included in the scheme, we no longer 
see a negative correlation between Androbugs and the other two tools. 
Table 23. Correlation between rankings generated by the tools for B3 
category mobsf vs qark qark vs androbugs androbugs vs mobsf 
finance 1 1 0.4 
insurance 0 1 0.316227766 
shopping 0.666666667 0.666666667 0.6 
news 0.182574186 0.666666667 0.316227766 
travel -0.2 -0.2 0.555555556 
games 0.658024443 0.521408887 0.587105835 
photography 0.539210355 0.263874275 0.292144907 
tools 0.561365983 0.396201065 0.323881011 
 
With the ranking scheme B3, we see a similar pattern. The ranking generated by all the 
tools are slightly correlated to each other. 
4.3 Combined tool results 
We have evaluated the rankings generated by the individual tools and ranking schemes. In 




 Consensus Scheme treating each tool equally (C1) Results 
The summary of results on the consensus scheme treating each tool equally is in the table 
below: 
Table 24. C1 Summary 


































































































































































































We can see that the number of ties is reduced when we combine multiple tools. We can 
also observe that the rankings generated by B2 and B3 are highly correlated. This is further 
illustrated by the Kendall Tau’s correlation in table below: 
  
Table 25. Kendall Tau's Correlation for C1 
category B1 vs B2 B2 vs B3 B3 vs B1 
finance 0.316227766 1 0.316227766 
insurance 0.2 1 0.2 
shopping 0.2 1 0.2 
news 0.8 1 0.8 
travel 0.333333333 0.555555556 0.777777778 
games 0.637573235 0.982112436 0.635838342 
photography 0.663654909 0.983569135 0.673557399 
tools 0.510261994 0.964515543 0.491188387 
 
The high correlation between the combined rankings generated using B2 and B3 are 
confirmed in the larger datasets as well. 
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 Consensus Scheme based on the trust of the tools (C2) Results 
For Consensus Scheme that takes the trust of the tools into factoring, the results are 
summarized in the table below: 
Table 26. C2 Summary 

































































































































































































Looking at the BDU-values, we can see that this ranking scheme balances out the low belief 
values due to larger number of negative evidences. The trust values of the tool calculated using 
the benchmark results help in achieving this balance.  
The Kendall Tau’s correlation can be seen in the table below: 
Table 27. Kendall Tau's Correlation for C2 
category B1 vs B2 B2 vs B3 B3 vs B1 
finance 0.527046277 0.8 0.737864787 
insurance 0.8 1 0.8 
shopping 0.4 1 0.4 
news 1 1 1 
travel 1 1 1 
games 0.594867537 0.971890971 0.600017905 
photography 0.289581722 0.94538187 0.289354926 
tools 0.555506202 0.985445567 0.565523043 
 
Similar to the C1 ranking scheme, the consensus based on B2 ranking scheme and B3 
ranking scheme are heavily correlated. This can be seen in categories that have lesser number of 
apps for which we have performed detailed analysis as well as in the larger datasets. There is also 




In this chapter, we have evaluated the tools against the benchmark and analyzed the results 
from the different ranking schemes proposed in this thesis. 
In the evaluation of tools against the benchmark, we had seen that all MobSF and Qark 
tools had similar performances, and AndroBugs had the worst performance. Their F1-scores were 
0.41 for MobSF, 0.42 for Qark, and 0.33 for AndroBugs. 
The ranking scheme based on only the categories of evidences (B1) generally have lots of 
ties. This can be primarily attributed to the fact that many apps could contain same number of 
security vulnerabilities and good practices. This is a really naïve approach and is not recommended 
to be used. 
The ranking scheme based on the frequency of evidences (B2) may provide a better 
reflection of the app rankings. The rankings still have a slight correlation with ranking scheme B1 
due to the fact that the apps with higher number of categories of evidences have higher frequency 
of evidences in many cases. However, there are cases when apps with smaller or equal number of 
categories of evidences have those evidences in large frequencies that may alter the rankings 
drastically. 
The ranking scheme based on the severity of evidences (B3) builds upon the ranking 
scheme B2 and is highly correlated to it. Similar to ranking scheme B2, the ranking scheme B3 
also has slight correlation with ranking scheme B1 in most of the cases, and for similar reasons. 
Many of the apps have similar categories, and many of the categories have similar severity. This 
means that only when the apps have very distinct severity levels of the evidences, the rankings are 
altered from ranking scheme B2. 
We also looked at two ways to combine the rankings from different tools. In the first case 
(ranking scheme C1), we considered evidences from all tools equally and in second case (ranking 
scheme C2), we added weights to the tools based on its performance on benchmark. We noticed 
that the trends we saw while using the tools individually were present in the combined rankings as 
well. 
After comparing the different ranking schemes, we recommend using the ranking scheme 
B3 as it takes the most criteria into consideration. Though it is similar to ranking scheme B2, it is 
a more accurate reflection of the security vulnerabilities and good practices present in an app. 
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Depending on a user’s preference of tools, the rankings can be generated using a single 
tool or a combination of tools. The results for the combined rankings consider all three analysis 
tools but depending on the relevance of tool for a user, we could also use only a subset of the three 
tools or add more tools. 
There are no established rankings related to the security of the apps that can be considered 
as the ground truth to compare against. There are third party app rankings such as AppBrain [47], 
and AppAnnie [48] which provide rankings based on the number of downloads. Other efforts 
carried out by Chowdhury et al. [40] [41] [42] and Gallege et al. [49] combine evidences obtained 
both from the code analysis and user reviews. Since we are evaluating only the security evidences, 
it would not be appropriate to compare our ranking schemes to these other approaches. The ranking 
comparison, in addition, would require the use of same dataset – which is not the case with the 
other approaches. Thus, we have limited the correlation calculation to the different ranking 




 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis has proposed several ranking schemes for ranking Android apps based on the 
different security evidences generated by static analysis tools. Three ranking schemes were 
proposed for ranking apps based on number of categories of the evidences, the frequency of the 
evidences, and the severity of the evidences. The results from the proposed ranking schemes were 
evaluated, and the ranking scheme based on the severity of evidences is the recommended ranking 
scheme, because it considers most factor for ranking the apps.  
Two additional ranking schemes were also proposed to combine rankings from different 
tools. The first combined ranking scheme combines the tools considering each tool to be equally 
weighted, and the second combined ranking scheme considers the weightage of tools based on the 
performance of the tools in the benchmark. The combined ranking schemes can be used to generate 
a combined ranking for any of the base ranking models for individual tools. 
In summary, the major contributions of the thesis are as follows: 
• This research evaluated each tool individually to identify the findings reported by the tool 
and determine the CVSS score for each finding that is reported by the tools. 
• Different static analysis tools available to evaluate android apps were identified. 
• The benchmarks used in the research community for the static analysis tool for Android 
were identified and the Ghera benchmark was selected for evaluating the tools. 
• The static code analysis tools were evaluated against the Ghera benchmark. 
• Subjective Logic was used to represent the evaluation of the apps and ranking them. 
• Three rankings schemes were proposed and the results for each tool were evaluated for 
each ranking scheme. 
• Results for two additional schemes to combined rankings from different tools were 
evaluated. 
• The ranking scheme based on the severity was the recommended scheme as it took most 
criteria into factoring, but other schemes may still be used depending on a user’s preference. 




There are several limitations to the work in this thesis. The limitations that were identified 
were as follows: 
• The CVSS score used in this research is generally determined by the security experts for 
each vulnerability identified in an app. We have generalized to apply the CVSS for the 
vulnerabilities identified by the tools without looking at each app based on the description, 
and the data from the NVD database. 
• The CVSS score was also calculated for the good practices based on the vulnerabilities it 
tries to mitigate. The CVSS score is originally designed to be assigned for vulnerabilities 
only. 
• The static code analysis tools tend to have lots of false positives, and we have tried to 
mitigate it by evaluating the tools against the benchmark. But there are still many findings 
that could be false positives while calculating the rankings. 
• Qark and AndroBugs have not been updated recently and may not detect vulnerabilities 
introduced in newer versions of Android 
This work provides a base for many future endeavors. This work can be extended to a 
larger dataset of apps and across other categories. The set of tools can also be expanded as new 
tools are developed. New schemes can also be developed by identifying other criteria for 
evaluating apps. As there is more research on holistic ranking of apps, the work in this thesis can 
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